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Abstract 
In electronic business environment, it is critical for 
an enterprise to assess information systems security 
(ISS) risks. In this paper, we propose a hybrid 
approach for ISS risk assessment in e-business. 
Given there is a great deal of uncertainty in the ISS 
risk assessment in e-business environment, in the 
hybrid approach, we combine the evidence theory 
with fuzzy sets to deal with the uncertain evidence 
found in the ISS risk assessment. The proposed 
approach provides a new way to define the basic 
belief assignment in fuzzy measure. Moreover, the 
approach also provides a method of testing the 
evidential consistency, which can reduce the 
uncertainty derived from the conflicts of evidence. 
Finally, the approach is further demonstrated and 
validated via a case study, in which sensitivity 
analysis is employed to validate the reliability of 
the proposed approach. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In electronic business, the dependence on 
information systems (IS) has increased in current 
business environments where a variety of 
transactions involving trading of goods and 
services are accomplished electronically [1, 2]. 
Increasing organizational dependence on the IS in 
e-business has led to a corresponding increase in 
the impact of information systems security (ISS) 
abuses. Therefore, the ISS is a critical issue that has 
attracted much attention from both researchers and 
practitioners in e-business. 
In order to prevent security breaches, businesses 
use controls (and various countermeasures) to 
safeguard their assets from various patterns of 
threats by identifying the IS assets that are 
vulnerable to threats. But, even in the presence of 
controls, the assets are often not fully protected 
from threats because of inherent control 
weaknesses. Thus, the risk assessment is a critical 
step for the ISS risk management in e-business [3]. 
In practice, the ISS risk assessment is quite 
complex and full of the uncertainty as well [4]. The 
uncertainty, existing in the risk assessment in 
e-business, has been the primary factor that 
influences the effectiveness of the ISS risk 
assessment to a large extent. Therefore, in order to 
deal with the incompleteness and vagueness of 
information, the uncertainty must be taken into 
account in the ISS risk assessment. However, most 
existing approaches applied to the ISS risk 
assessment have some drawbacks on handling 
uncertainty in the process of assessment.  
To address these aforementioned issues in 
e-business, we propose a hybrid approach that 
combines the evidence theory with fuzzy sets for 
ISS risk assessment in electronic business. In this 
paper, the approach provides a new way to define 
the basic belief assignment in fuzzy measure for 
dealing with the uncertain evidence found in the 
ISS risk assessment in e-business. Moreover, we 
discuss a process of testing the evidential 
consistency in the ISS risk assessment in e-business. 
This process can effectively reduce the uncertainty 
derived from the conflicts of evidence provided by 
experts. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 reviews the related works on ISS risk 
assessment in e-business. In the next section, we 
discuss the procedure of the hybrid approach for 
ISS risk assessment in detail in Section 3. Then, the 
proposed approach is further demonstrated and 
validated in Section 4 via a case study. Finally, we 
summarize our contributions and present our 
further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Related Work 
The existing approaches for the ISS risk assessment 
in e-business can be grouped into three major 
categories: the quantitative approaches, the 
qualitative approaches, and the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
The quantitative approaches consider the IS risk 
exposure as a function of the probability of a threat 
and the expected loss due to the vulnerability of the 
organization to this threat [5, 6]. The stochastic 
dominance (SD) approach [7] focuses on 
answering the specific question of what 
contingency plan should be used to prevent losses 
if a disaster occurs. To achieve this goal, the SD 
compares the costs associated with various backup 
and recovery options during the entire disaster 
recovery process in all areas of the organization. 
However, it fails to provide guidance on how to 
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assess the failure of multiple controls pertaining to 
a single threat or how to assess the failure and the 
impact of a single control on multiple threats. The 
proposed approach in this paper provides a 
structure to the ISS risk assessment process by 
decomposing risk into its subcomponents and 
identifying relevant controls and their 
interrelationships. The approach based on neural 
networks [8] consists of five phases: network 
parameter initialization, input the training sample 
and the expectation output, network self-learning, 
forward propagation, and back propagation. If the 
error function value is smaller than the 
pre-established value, the network learning is 
stopped, otherwise turn to the second phase. While 
this approach has the intelligent features such as 
the self-learning and the acquisition of knowledge, 
which is different from the conventional methods, 
it is very difficult to get a large numbers of training 
samples for network self-learning in the process of 
the risk assessment in e-business. The modular 
attack trees [9] approach is specified as parametric 
constraints, which allow quantifying the probability 
of security breaches that occur due to internal 
component vulnerabilities as well as vulnerabilities 
in the component’s deployment environment. 
Based on the attack probabilities and the structure 
of the modular attack trees, security risks can be 
estimated for the information system. But, this 
approach has the difficulties capturing the 
uncertainty in the ISS risk environment dealing 
with the existence of the incompleteness and 
vagueness of information. 
In the qualitative approaches, such as the logic 
analysis [10] and the Delphi method [11], the 
probability data is not required and only the 
estimated potential loss is used. Since the 
qualitative analysis depends to a great extent on the 
analyst’s experience, both the process and the 
result of the security risk assessment are relatively 
subjective [12].  
As information systems have become more 
complex in e-business, neither quantitative nor 
qualitative approaches can properly model the 
assessment process alone. Therefore, the 
comprehensive approaches combining both the 
quantitative and the qualitative approaches are 
needed [13, 14]. The approach using the Bayesian 
Networks (BNs) [15, 16, 17] provides an objective 
and visible support for risk analysis. It consists of 
three phases: the BN initialization (define the 
structure and the set of conditional probability 
distributions), the risk monitoring, and the risk 
analysis. Using new evidence obtained from 
information system, this approach can continually 
estimate risk probability and identify the sources of 
risk. The approach based on the fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation (FCE) [18, 19, 20] is a 
mathematical method to comprehensively evaluate 
the ISS risks by using fuzzy set theory of fuzzy 
mathematics. Although this approach is good at 
processing the ambiguous information by 
simulating the characteristic of human in making 
the judgment, it is not capable to provide the 
graphical relationships among various ISS risk 
factors using flow charts or diagrams. The 
proposed approach in this paper consists of the 
graphical representation of relevant constructs 
through an evidential diagram, which can fully 
capture the complexity of multiple controls dealing 
with one threat and also that of one control dealing 
with multiple threats. In addition, both the above 
approaches are suffering from the uncertainty 
derived from the conflicts of evidence provided by 
experts. In this paper, we propose a method of 
testing the evidential consistency, which can reduce 
the uncertainty derived from the conflicts of 
evidence. 
In this paper, we combine the evidence theory with 
fuzzy sets to model the uncertainty involved in the 
ISS risk assessment in e-business. In addition to 
representing uncertainties, the present approach 
allows the decision maker to develop an evidential 
diagram to assess the ISS risk that contains various 
variables such as the IS assets, the related threats, 
and the corresponding countermeasures in 
e-business. Next, the decision maker can input his 
or her judgments about the presence or absence of 
threats and the impact of countermeasures on the 
corresponding threats according to belief functions. 
 
2.2 Evidence Theory 
The evidence theory, also called the 
Dempster-Shafer’s theory, has often been applied 
in the reasoning under uncertainty [21, 22]. 
Suppose we have a decision problem with n 
possible elements or states of nature forming a 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive set. 
This set is called the frame of discernment 
represented by Θ. The power set of Θ containing 
all the possible subsets of Θ, represented as P(Θ). 
A basic belief assignment (BBA) is a function from 
P(Θ) to [0, 1] defined by: 
( )
( )
: [m P
A m A
Θ →
6
0,1]
,                        (1) 
where A is an element of P(Θ). In addition, it 
satisfies the following conditions: 
( )
( )
1
A P
m A
Θ∈
=∑ ,                         (2) 
( )m ∅ =0.                              (3) 
Basically, the BBA pertaining to a statement 
measures the degree of belief directly assigned to 
the statement based on the evidence. 
Dempster’s rule is the fundamental rule for 
combining two or more items of evidence in the 
belief function framework. For simplicity, let us 
illustrate Dempster’s rule for only two items of 
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evidence. In general, if m1 and m2 are two BBAs 
representing two independent items of evidence 
pertaining to Θ, then the combined BBAs for a 
subset A of frame Θ using Dempster’s rule is given 
by 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2
B C A
m A K m B m C−
=
= ∑
∩
,            (4) 
where ( ) (1 21
B C
 
3. The Hybrid Approach for ISS Risk 
Assessment 
The hybrid approach consists of four phases: (a) 
establish the ISS index system and quantify the 
index weights, (b) construct the evidential diagram, 
(c) compute the BBAs for the assertions in the 
evidential diagram, (d) test the evidential 
consistency. Each phase is discussed in detail as 
follows. And, the procedure of the approach is 
given in Figure 1.
)K m B m C
=∅
= − ∑
∩
, which 
represents the renormalization constant. The 
second term in K represents the conflict. 
Establish ISS index system and quantify index weights 
Construct the evidential diagram 
Compute the BBAs for subassertions and main assertion 
Compute the similarity matrix 
Is the similarity of any 
two items of evidence 
greater than or equal to 
the threshold? 
Compute the credibility 
of the items of evidence 
Compute weighted 
average for the BBAs Combination of evidence 
Yes
No 
 
Figure 1. The hybrid approach procedure. 
3.1 Establish the ISS Index System and Quantify 
Index Weights 
The ISS index system is based on the risk analysis, 
which includes the identification of vulnerabilities 
and threats, the analysis of the losses arising from 
the threats acting on vulnerabilities [23]. Based on 
the ISS risk analysis for an on-line securities 
company (see Section 4)，we have established the 
index system (see Table 1).  
For quantifying the index weights, six information 
system experts, two of which are also this 
company’s IT managers, were invited to fill in the 
questionnaires about the comparison table of factor 
weights. And then, we have quantified the index 
weights using the method in reference [24]. This 
method can effectively reduce the uncertainty in 
the process of quantifying index weights [24]. 
 
3.2 Construct the Evidential Diagram 
An evidential diagram consists of assertions, 
evidence, and their interrelationships. Assertions 
include the main assertion and subassertions. The  
Table 1. ISS risk index system and index weights. 
First 
level 
index
Second level 
indexes Weights Third level indexes Weights
Hardware defects 0.134 
Software defects 0.369 
Network 
vulnerabilities 0.284 
ISS 
vulnerabilities 0.262 
Communication 
protocol 
vulnerabilities 
0.213 
Deletion or loss of 
information 0.264 
Breach of network 
resources 0.303 
Information abuse 0.229 
ISS threat 0.246 
Information 
leakage 0.204 
Tangible assets loss 0.512 
Assets loss 0.206 Intangible assets 
loss 0.488 
Service 
interruption 0.681 
Service delay 0.184 Capability loss 0.173 
Service weakening 0.135 
Cost of information 
recovery 0.338 
ISS 
risk 
Cost of system 
recovery 0.113 Cost of service 
recovery 0.662 
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main assertion is the highe ; the 
Figure 2. Hypothetical evidential diagram for ISS 
 
.3 Compute the BBAs for Assertions in 
dence is generally described 
e combine evidence theory with 
me that E is an evidence space, E = {e1, 
st-level assertion
subassertions are lower-level assertions. 
Relationships between assertions (e.g., between the 
main assertion and subassertions, and between 
higher-level subassertions and lower-level 
subassertions) need to be defined using logical 
relationships such as “and” and “or.” And evidence 
represents the information that supports or negates 
assertions. 
In this paper, the evidential diagram is derived 
from the ISS index system. Suppose a manager is 
interested in evaluating the ISS risk involved in the 
ISS vulnerabilities. The corresponding evidential 
diagram is given in Figure 2, which is a part of the 
evidential diagram for the main assertion “ISS risk” 
in a securities company. In Figure 2, the rounded 
boxes represent assertion nodes. And evidence 
nodes are represented by rectangular boxes in the 
evidential diagrams. Numbers in parentheses 
represent weights. Evidence nodes are connected to 
the corresponding assertion(s) that they directly 
pertain to. For instance, the evidence “E1.1.1 
Vulnerabilities of hardware protection measures” 
directly pertains to assertion “A1.1 ISS 
vulnerabilities” and thus it is connected to that 
assertion. 
 
vulnerabilities. 
 
3
Evidential Diagram 
In e-business, the evi
in fuzzy form in ISS risk assessment [25]. For this 
reason, we introduce fuzzy sets to evidence space 
and define the BBAs in fuzzy measure so that we 
can further reduce the degree of uncertainty in ISS 
risk assessment. 
In this section, w
fuzzy sets to compute the BBAs in fuzzy form as 
follow. 
We assu
e2,…, en}, and Θ = {a1, a2,…, am}. 
Definition 1. Let F  be a fuzzy set on E, 
[ ]: 0,1 , )Fu E e u→ → . Then (F e Fu   is called 
membership functi  on for F , and  is called 
a membership from e to 
( )Fu e
F . Let  a set 
composed of fuzzy subsets of E, then F(E) is called 
the fuzzy power set of E. 
Definition 2. Let 1 2
F(E
( )F F ∈ 、 F E . Then 
1 2F F
u ∪  and 
1 2F F
u ∩   are defined as: 
(1
) be
) ( ) ( )Fe u e∪ ∨ ( )F F Fu u e   ; 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2F F F F
u e u e∩ ∧   
inition 3. If the following conditions hold: 
u e . (2)
Def
(1) ( )E F E∈ ; 
(2) If ( )1 2 nF F F F∈  "、 、 、 E , then ( )
1
n
i
i
F F E
=
∈∪ , 
(E) is called a fuzzy additive set. 
ity density 
then F
Definition 4. Let P(ei) be a probabil
function on E, F(E) a fuzzy additive set on E, and 
wi a weight of ei. If ( )F F E∈ , then the 
probability ( )P F  can be d
( ) n= =
efined as: 
( ) ( )
1
1,2, ,i i iF
i
P F u e w P e i n
=
∑  "       (5) 
Definition 5. Set up a mapping
of P(Θ). 
( ): F EΓ Θ→ . Let 
Aj be an element If 
( ) ( ), . .k k jF F E s t F AΓ∃ ∈ =   (j = 1, 2, ... , 2m; k = 
 [1, 2, … , l), then the mapping ] [ ]: 0,1PΓ Θ → is 
defined as: E1.1.1 Vulnerabilities of hardware 
protection measures (0.134) 
[ ]( ) ( )( )
0
k
k j
k
F F E
j F A
j
j
P F
P A
A
M
A
ΓΓ ∈ =
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎜ ⎟= ⎨ ⎝ ⎠ ≠ ∅⎪⎪⎪ = ∅⎩


∪
,       (6) 
where 
( )( )( )j kj k j
k
A P F F E
A F A
M P F
Θ
Γ
∈ ∈
≠∅ =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜⎝
∑


∪
( )
⎟⎠
. Let 
⎟⎠
, we have: 
       (7) 
Based on above definitions, we can propose the 
( )k k j
k
F F E
F A
B F
Γ
∈
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜⎝


 ∪
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ){ } ( )( )
1
1
max
j
j
k
k j
j
j
n
i i iB
A P i
A
n
i i iFF AA P i
A
M u e w P e
u e w P e
Θ
ΓΘ
∈ =
≠∅
=∈ =
≠∅
=
=
∑ ∑
∑ ∑


.
following proposition: 
Proposition 1. [ ]( )jPΓ A  is a BBA on Θ. 
Proof:  
If jA = ∅ , then [ ]( ) 0PΓ ∅ = ; 
If jA ≠ ∅ , we have: 
A1.1 ISS vulnerabilities  
(0.262) 
E1.1.2 Software security Hidden 
danger (0.369) 
E1.1.3 Vulnerabilities of network 
security protection measures (0.284) 
E1.1.4 Communication protocol  
vulnerabilities (0.213) 
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[ ]( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )( )
1 1
k
k j
j j
j k
k j
k
F F E
F A
j
A P A P
k
A P F F E
F A
P F
P A
M
P F
M
Γ
Θ Θ
Θ
Γ
Γ
∈
=
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑
∑






∪
∪
. 
The proposition is proved. 
According to above definitions and Proposition 1, 
the mass function, i.e. [ ]( )jP AΓ , can effectively 
meet the requirement to deal with the situation 
where there is the uncertain evidence in the process 
of ISS risk assessment in e-business.  
 
3.4 Test the Evidential Consistency 
In the uncertain reasoning by evidence theory, if an 
item of evidence is in conflict with other(s), the 
reasoning result would not be sound [26]. To 
illustrate the conflict of evidences, we give an 
example as follow. 
Assumed that the frame Θ is {a, b, c}. If the BBAs 
for an item of evidence A are m1(a) = 0.99 and m1(b) 
= 0.01, and the BBAs for an item of evidence B are 
m2(b) = 0.01 and m2(c) = 0.99, then we have m(a) = 
m(c) = 0 and m(b) = 1 by combining of evidences. 
Although the supports of A and B for event b is 
very low, the reasoning result is that the event b is 
true. It is obviously not reasonable. Therefore, the 
testing evidential consistency has important 
significance for the ISS risk assessment based on 
evidence theory. 
Furthermore, we discuss the process of testing 
evidential consistency in detail next. 
Definition 6. Let ( )PS Θ be the space generated by 
all the subsets of Θ. A BBA is a vector mG  of 
( )PS Θ with coordinates ( )im A  such that 
( ) ( )2
1
1 0, 1,
N
, 2Ni i
i
m A and m A i
=
= ≥ =∑ … ,     (8) 
where ( )iA P Θ∈ . 
Assume that m1 and m2 are two BBAs on the same 
frame of discernment Θ. According to reference 
[22], the distance between m1 and m2 is: 
( ) ( )2 21 2 1 2 1 21, || || || || 2 ,2BPAd m m m m m m= + − 〈G G G G 〉
〉
 (9) 
where is the scalar product defined by 1 2,m m〈 G G
( ) ( )2 21 2 1 2
1 1
| |
,
| |
N N
i j
i j
i j i j
A A
m m m A m A
A A= =
〈 〉 = ∑∑ ∩G G ∪ ,   (10) 
with Ai , Aj∈P(Θ) for i, j = 1,…, 2N. is then 
the square norm of : 
2|| ||mG
mG
2|| || ,m m m= 〈 〉G G G .                         (11) 
Based on the evidential distance, we can further 
define the similarity of two BBAs: ( ) ( ), 1 , , 1,2,i j BPA i jS m m d m m i j n= − = ", . (12) 
Thus the result can be represented by a similarity 
matrix: 
12 1 1
1 2
1 2
1
1
j n
i i ij in
n n nj
S S S
S S S SSM
S S S
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
" "
# # # # #
" "
# # # # #
" "
. 
Furthermore, the support for a BBA  is: im
( ) ( )
1
, , 1, 2,
n
i i j
j
j i
Sup m S m m i j n
=
≠
= =∑ ", .    (13) 
The support for the BBA mi, i.e. Sup(mi), reflects 
the degree of the support of other BBAs. Based on 
it, we have the credibility C(mi): 
( ) ( )
( )
1
, 1,2, ,ii n
i
i
Sup m
C m i j n
Sup m
=
= =
∑
" .       (14) 
Obviously, ( )
1
1
n
i
i
C m
=
=∑ . Therefore, C(mi) can 
represent the weight of the BBA mi. 
In the process of testing evidential consistency in 
the ISS risk assessment, a threshold value ξ  can 
be set according to the actual situations. If the 
similarity of any two items of evidence is greater 
than or equal to the threshold value ξ , then it is 
considered that the existing items of evidence are 
consistent. In contrast, if the similarity is lesser 
than ξ , we have to adjust the existing items of 
evidence.  
For the evidential adjustment, if an item of 
evidence is supported by other items of evidence, 
then it has a higher credibility and we assign a 
larger weight for it in evidence combination; In 
contrast, if an item of evidence is in conflict with 
other items of evidence, then its credibility and 
weight should be smaller. The steps of the 
evidential adjustment are as follows: 
Step 1. Obtain the credibility of the items of 
evidence. 
Based on Eqs. (13) and (14), we can obtain the 
credibility of the items of evidence. 
Step 2. Weighted average for BBAs of the items of 
evidence 
Let us treat the credibility as the weight of evidence. 
Then, we weighted average for BBAs of the items 
of evidence. 
Step 3. Combine the weighted average evidence. 
According to reference [27], if there are n items of 
evidence, we combine the weighted average 
evidence n-1 times using Eq. (4).  
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4. Case Analysis and Evaluation 
In order to further validate the proposed approach, 
we used it in assessing an actual company’s 
information systems. This company is a Chinese 
financial services firm providing on-line services in 
securities trading and sales. 
In this section, we first demonstrate the presented 
approach via a case study according to the 
procedure of Section 3. Then sensitivity analysis is 
employed to validate the reliability of the proposed 
approach. Finally, the effectiveness of the approach 
is evaluated by comparing the results of the 
proposed model in this paper, the fuzzy 
comprehensive evaluation (FCE), the Bayesian 
Networks (BNs), and evidence theory.  
 
4.1 Case Analysis 
We invited six information system experts, two of 
which are also IT managers of the company, to 
assess the security risk of the company's 
information systems. As mentioned in Section 3.1, 
the ISS index system and weights have been 
established based on the risk analysis for this 
securities company (see Table 1).  
Furthermore, based upon the ISS index system, an 
evidential diagram (see Figure 3) for the main 
assertion “ISS risk” was developed. In Figure 3, we 
used the “and” relationship between the main 
assertion and the subassertions, which implies that 
the main assertion is true if and only if all 
subassertions are true. 
E1.1.1 Vulnerabilities of hardware 
protection measures (0.134) 
 
Figure 3. Evidential diagram for the main assertion “ISS risk”. 
According to the evidential diagram, we defined 
the frame of discernment of the assertions as Θ = 
{very high risk, high risk, median risk, low risk, 
very low risk}, where A1={very high risk}, 
A2={high risk}, A3={median risk}, A4={low risk}, 
and A5={very low risk}. With the exception of A1 to 
A5, other subsets of P(Θ), noted by U, represent the 
unknown degree of evidence.  
Six experts assessed the strength of evidence, 
which indicate the level of support that an item of 
evidence provides. For simplicity, we illustrated 
the process of reasoning by the strength of an item 
of evidence provided by one expert.  
Strength of evidence is represented by fuzzy form. 
In this case study, we employed asymmetric 
triangular membership function [28] to describe the 
belief degree of evidence. As shown in Figure 4, 
the membership values of the evidence E, E = {e1, 
e2,…, e15}, are provided by an expert. 1F  to 5F  
are defined as the fuzzy subsets on E and the level 
A1. ISS 
risk 
A1.1 ISS  
Vulnerabilities 
(0.262) 
A1.2 Threat 
(0.246) 
A1.4 Capability loss 
(0.173) 
A1.5 Cost of system 
recovery (0.113) 
E1.1.2 Software security Hidden 
danger (0.369) 
E1.1.3 Vulnerabilities of network 
security protection measures (0.284) 
E1.1.4 Communication protocol 
vulnerabilities (0.213) 
E1.2.1 Deletion or loss of information 
due to misoperation (0.264) 
E1.2.2 Breach of network resources 
due to network attacks (0.303) 
& 
E1.2.3 Information abuse (0.229) 
E1.2.4 Information leakage (0.204) 
E1.4.1 Service interruption (0.681) 
E1.4.2 Service delay (0.184) 
E1.4.3 Service weakening (0.135) 
E1.5.1 Cost of information recovery 
(0.338) 
E1.5.2 Cost of service recovery 
(0.662) 
A1.3 Assets loss 
(0.206) 
E1.3.1 Tangible assets loss (0.512) 
E1.3.2 Intangible assets loss (0.488) 
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of risk of kF  is higher than 1kF − . Then, based on 
Proposition 1, the BBAs for s sertions A1.1 to 
A1.5 were computed (see Table 2). 
ubas
 
Figure 4. Membership function. 
Table 2. The BBAs for the subassertions. 
Sub- 
assertion ( )1m A  ( )2m A  ( )3m A  ( )4m A  ( )5m A ( )m U
A1.1 0.107 .216 .203 .215 0.172 0.077  0  0  0
A1.2 0.093 0.177 0.130 0.345 0.208 0.047 
A1.3 0.069 0.131 0.169 0.251 0.257 0.123 
A1.4 0.132 0.147 0.206 0.331 0.149 0.035 
A1.5 0.070 0.131 0.133 0.298 0.332 0.036 
 
The BBAs for main assertion “ISS risk” are 
ly, we could also obtain the BBAs 
ertion “ISS risk”. 
Exper
computed by combining the BBAs of the 
subassertions based on the structure of Figure 3. 
This is done by propagating the BBAs through the 
network. Shenoy and Shafer [29] discussed this 
process in detail. The process of propagating BBAs 
in a network becomes computationally quite 
complex. However, there are several software 
packages available [30, 31] that facilitate the 
process. We use the tool for propagating 
uncertainty in valuation networks [30] to conduct 
the computation. The BBAs for main assertion 
“ISS risk” are m(A1) = 0.049, m(A2) = 0.162, m(A3) 
= 0.214, m(A4) = 0.316, m(A5) = 0.217, and m(U) = 
0.042. 
Similar
according to the strength of evidence provided by 
other five experts (see Table 3). 
Table 3. The BBAs for main ass
ts ( )1m A  ( )2m A  ( )3m A  ( )4m A  ( )5m A ( )m U
E ) 0.049 .162 0.214 .316 .217 0.042 xpert1(m1  0  0  0
Expert2(m2) 0.039 0.169 0.220 0.323 0.198 0.051 
Expert3(m3) 0.098 0.104 0.199 0.248 0.254 0.097 
Expert4(m4) 0.102 0.153 0.296 0.207 0.186 0.056 
Expert5(m5) 0.065 0.112 0.186 0.298 0.203 0.136 
Expert6(m6) 0.053 0.142 0.221 0.300 0.204 0.080 
Then, we tested the consistency of above six items 
of evidence from m1 to m6 as mentioned in Section 
3.4. Since there were only six experts participating 
in the risk assessment, we set a higher thresholdξ , 
ξ = 0.85. According to Table 3 and Eqs. (9) to (12), 
we obtained the similarity matrix: 
1 0.816 0.801 0.754 0.832 0.817
0.816 1 0.853 0.844 0.781 0.776
0.801 0.853 1 0.696 0.798 0.800
0.754 0.844 0.696 1 0.821 0.755
0.832 0.781 0.798 0.821 1 0.829
0.817 0.776 0.800 0.755 0.829 1
SM
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
It is obvious that the similarity of any two items of 
evidence is lesser than ξ . Therefore, we have to 
adjust the existing items of evidence. The results of 
adjustment are as follows: 
(1) Based on Eqs. (13) and (14), the credibility of 
the items of evidence are: 
C(m1) = 0.243, C(m2) = 0.216, C(m3) = 0.109, C(m4) 
= 0.045, C(m5) = 0.186, and C(m6) = 0.201. 
(2) Weighted average for BBAs of the items of 
evidence: 
mMAE(A1) = 0.058, mMAE(A2) = 0.143, mMAE(A3) = 
0.214, mMAE(A4) = 0.311, mMAE(A5) = 0.210, and 
mMAE(U) = 0.064. 
(3) Combine the weighted average evidence five 
times: 
m(A1) = 0.032, m(A2) = 0.138, m(A3) = 0.223, m(A4) 
= 0.416, m(A5) = 0.165, and m(U) = 0.026. 
Consequently, the results of ISS risk assessment in 
this case study is shown in Figure 5, in which the 
belief supporting A4, i.e. “ISS risk is low”, is 0.416. 
This suggests that we have the most confidence 
that the ISS risk is low. 
 
Figure 5. Results of the ISS risk assessment. 
 
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis  
In this section, we perform sensitivity analysis to 
investigate how the change of the strength of 
evidence affects the result of the ISS risk 
assessment.  
For instance, we decreased the strengths of E1.4.3 
and E1.4.1 (see in Figure 3), and then examined the 
impact of the change of the strength on the beliefs 
of the main assertion “A1. ISS risk” respectively. 
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The corresponding results are shown in Figure 6 
and Figure 7. 
The results in Figure 6 and Figure 7 indicate that 
although the strengths of E1.4.3 and E1.4.1 have 
been changed, the belief supporting A4 is still lager 
than others. Furthermore, by comparing Figure 6 
with Figure 7, we can also observe that the larger 
the weight of evidence, the larger the impact on the 
belief of the main assertion is, as shown in Figure 3 
where the weights of E1.4.3 and E1.4.1 are 0.135 
and 0.681 respectively. 
 
Figure 6. Impact of the change of E1.4.3 strength 
on the main assertion. 
 
Figure 7. Impact of the change of E1.4.1 strength 
on the main assertion. 
In addition, we have also performed sensitivity 
analysis to investigate how the strengths of other 
items of evidence affected the beliefs on the main 
assertions. The results showed that the small 
variations in the input strengths of evidence do not 
impact significantly the beliefs of the main 
assertion. This implies that the approach is robust 
and reliable to small amounts of measurement error 
in assessing strength of evidence. 
 
4.3 Evaluation of the Hybrid Approach 
Under the same conditions, we have employed the 
FCE, the BNs, and evidence theory to assess the 
ISS risk in this case study. 
In particular, we use Method1, Method2, Method3, 
and Method4 to refer to our proposed approach, 
FCE, BNs, and evidence theory respectively. 
Firstly, we compared the Method1 with the 
Method2 and the Method3 (see Figure 8). 
0
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Belief
Method1
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Very low 
 
Figure 8. Comparison of the Methodl, the Method2, 
and the Method3. 
The assessment results indicated that the sequences 
of risk level obtained from three methods are 
consistent. Furthermore, we can also observe that 
the degree of the belief of low risk level is higher in 
the Method1 than in the Method2 and the Method3, 
while the degrees of the belief of other levels are 
lower in the Method1 than in the Method2 and the 
Method3. Therefore, the Method1 is more effective 
than the other two methods in the ISS risk 
assessment in e-business. 
Secondly, we compared the Method1 with the 
Method4 (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of the Method1 and the 
Method4. 
The experiment results show that our proposed 
approach combining evidence theory with fuzzy 
sets outperforms evidence theory method in the ISS 
risk assessment in e-business. Moreover, in Figure 
9, we can also find that the m value of U in the 
Method1 is higher than that in the Method4. Thus, 
in the ISS risk assessment, there is lower 
uncertainty in the Method1 than in the Method4. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we propose a hybrid approach that 
combines the evidence theory with fuzzy sets for 
ISS risk assessment in electronic business. This 
approach has several advantages. First, the 
approach is based on evidence theory and fuzzy 
sets, which can effectively model the uncertainty 
involved in the assessment process in e-business. 
Second, for dealing with fuzzy evidence found in 
the ISS risk assessment, this approach provides a 
new way to define the basic belief assignment in 
fuzzy measure. Further, this approach also provides 
a method of testing the evidential consistency, 
which can reduce the uncertainty derived from the 
conflicts of evidence provided by experts. 
In this paper, we also employed the sensitivity 
analysis to validate the reliability of the proposed 
approach. In addition, the effectiveness of the 
approach is evaluated by comparing the results of 
risk assessment of the proposed approach in this 
paper, FCE, BNs, and evidence theory. 
Although the proposed approach performs with an 
advantage over existing methods in e-business 
environment, it still requires domain experts’ belief 
inputs at the individual evidence level. Future 
research will be conducted to explore how to better 
elicit practitioners’ assessments of the strength of 
the evidence.  
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